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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This is a show-cause proceeding to determine whether the State 
should be held in contempt because the 2014 Legislature did not submit 
the “complete plan” this Court directed in its January 2014 Order, and, if 
so, whether and when any sanction should be imposed.  McCleary v. State, 
No. 84362-7, Order to Show Cause at 3-4 (June 12, 2014).  The Court’s 
Order was explicit, specifically limiting the issues to be considered.  
Those issues do not include whether the State can demonstrate ultimate 
compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington Constitution or 
whether legislative actions to date evidence sufficient progress toward that 
compliance. 
 The State’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause 
explained the factual and legal reasons why the State should not be found 
in contempt; why no sanction should be ordered; why the sanctions 
Plaintiffs propose are impractical, unproductive, harmful, or beyond the 
Court’s constitutional authority; and why, if the Court determines a 
sanction should issue, any determination as to the proper sanction should 
be deferred until after the 2015 legislative session.  Plaintiffs’ answer 
responded with policy arguments and rhetorical questions, but it did not 
rebut those reasons with legal argument supported by pertinent authority. 
  2 
 Accordingly, this brief focuses primarily on whether the Court’s 
exercise of its contempt power is the proper vehicle to promote progress 
toward providing ample provision for basic education by 2018, concluding 
with a rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ request for their preferred three-part order.1 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The State Should Not Be Held in Contempt for the 
Legislature’s Failure to Submit a “Complete Plan” to the 
Court 
 The McCleary Plaintiffs (respondents in this appeal) argue that the 
Court must hold the State in contempt in order to coerce ample funding.  
Plaintiffs’ Answer at 36.  But the Order to Show Cause linked the 
possibility of contempt only to the State’s failure to submit a complete 
plan, not a prospective failure to fully implement its program of basic 
education by 2018.  Consequently, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs goes 
well beyond any sanction reasonably designed to compel preparation of a 
plan. 
 There is no doubt that the Court has power to enforce its orders.  
But, as explained in the State’s opening brief, the January 2014 Order was 
no run-of-the-mill court order, as in most contempt proceedings.  Indeed, 
Respondents have cited no contempt proceeding from any jurisdiction that 
                                                 
1
 This brief also includes the State’s responses to the amicus briefs filed in this 
case.  The State will file no separate answer. 
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involves a court order like the one at issue here.  Even the order in 
Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (1975), relied on by 
Plaintiffs, pales in comparison.  There, the Court considered holding the 
Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services in contempt for 
failing to follow an order to make drug treatment available to an offender 
in a correctional institution, but ended up continuing the request for 
contempt pending the Department’s ongoing efforts to comply. 
 By contrast, the January 2014 Order directed the State to submit “a 
complete plan for fully implementing its program of basic education for 
each school year between now and the 2017-18 school year” that included 
a phase-in schedule for fully funding each component of basic education.  
McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, Order at 8 (Jan. 9, 2014).  That is a 
complicated and difficult task.  The Legislature already had adopted 
scheduled phase-in dates in statute.  For example, transportation funding 
was scheduled to be fully phased in by the 2013-15 biennium, 
RCW 28A.160.192, and that deadline was met.  State’s Reply at 7 (May 
29, 2014).  Funding for MSOCs (materials, supplies, and operating costs) 
is scheduled to be fully phased in during the 2015-16 school year.  
RCW 28A.150.260(8)(b).  Class size reductions are to be fully 
implemented by 2017-18.  RCW 28A.150.260(4)(b).  But the Court sought 
additional detail that would require the Legislature to decide how to 
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rebalance spending priorities and/or restructure revenue generation well 
into the future.  As explained in the State’s Opening Brief at 10-12, the 
failure to arrive at a consensus on such a fundamental question should not 
be considered willful disobedience by a co-equal branch, nor should it 
give rise to contempt in this case.  It is appropriate for the Court to 
maintain pressure on the Legislature to continue working toward 
constitutional compliance; it is not appropriate for the Court to hold the 
State in contempt because the Legislature did not pass a bill or resolution. 
 Moreover, holding the State in contempt for a failure to legislate is 
a slippery slope.  Witness the argument in the amicus brief of the 
Washington State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 1, that the State’s 
“failure to adopt any new revenue measures constitutes contempt of this 
Court’s order.”  The failure to legislate new revenue measures does not 
provide a basis for finding contempt of the Court’s order to submit a plan. 
 Respondents have cited no contempt case that involves a court 
order analogous to the task assigned to the Legislature by this Court in 
January.  That Order called upon the Legislature to truncate a consensus-
building process that properly is carried out over multiple years, as 
described in the amicus brief submitted by the former Governors of 
  5 
Washington,
2
 and by this Court in its decision.  McCleary v. State, 173 
Wn.2d. 477, 545, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).  Indeed, the range of public 
interests highlighted in the several amicus briefs illustrates the enormity of 
the task of creating a sustainable plan for funding and fully implementing 
the reforms initiated by ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776
3
 while maintaining 
essential services to Washington residents.  Amicus brief of former 
Governors at 15-17; Amicus brief of the Washington State Budget & 
Policy Center et al. at 11-14; Amicus brief of Columbia Legal Services et 
al. at 4-17.  Although Plaintiffs casually dismiss every state program other 
than basic education as “non-paramount,” the Legislature has a duty to the 
public to consider how funding decisions will affect public health, safety, 
and welfare, not to mention other legal duties imposed by the constitution, 
the courts, and federal law. 
 In a very real way, the Court’s January 2014 Order accomplished 
its purpose:  it created urgency and dialogue in the Legislature, setting the 
stage for the “next full opportunity to make meaningful progress”—i.e., 
the 2015 legislative session.
4
  The Plaintiffs’ simplistic test for finding 
                                                 
2
 Amicus brief of former Governors Daniel J. Evans, John Spellman, Mike 
Lowry, Gary Locke, and Christine Gregoire at 10-14. 
3
 Laws of 2009, ch. 548, and Laws of 2010, ch. 236, respectively. 
4
 Amicus brief of former Governors at 6.  See also Report to the Washington 
State Supreme Court by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation (Apr. 30, 
  6 
contempt—whether the Legislature knowingly adjourned at the end of the 
60-day session in 2014—does not do justice to the circumstances here.  
First, the Legislature is required by law to adjourn after 60 days.  Const. 
art. II, § 12.  Second, Plaintiffs assume, without any evidence, that more 
progress toward the 2018 deadline would have been accomplished in a 
special session than by planning for the forthcoming budget session.
5
  The 
true measure of the State’s progress will be the actions the Legislature 
takes in the 2015 session. 
 Even if the Court could find contempt, it need not do so to hold the 
State accountable for implementing the remedy ordered in the McCleary 
decision.  As explained below, the Court already has adequate remedial 
tools to address laws that violate the Constitution. 
B. If the Court Finds the State in Contempt for Failing to Provide 
a “Complete Plan,” It Should Not Order Any Sanction to 
Compel a Plan 
1. Formulating a Remedy in a Positive Rights Case Tests 
the Limits of Judicial Power and Restraint 
 The Court explained that the duty placed on the State to amply 
fund basic education creates a corresponding “positive right” held by 
                                                                                                                         
2014) (Leg. 2014 Report) at 32-33 (explaining the enhanced prospect of achieving 
consensus in the 2015 Legislature and acknowledging the need to do so). 
5
 Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the substantial preparatory effort for each 
legislative session accomplished by legislators and their staff outside the legislative 
chambers. 
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schoolchildren, which is distinct from other “rights” such as the freedom 
of religion or freedom of speech, which are framed as negative restrictions 
on government action.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 518-19.  Where a court 
finds that government is violating a right framed as a negative restriction, 
the appropriate response of the court is to order government to stop the 
violation.  But this Court carefully explained that this approach “provides 
the wrong lens for analyzing positive constitutional rights.”  McCleary, 
173 Wn.2d at 519.  The question is not whether government has 
overstepped its constitutional bounds such that it must be ordered to cease 
the offending conduct; the proper question is whether the government’s 
action “achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally 
prescribed end.’ ”  Id. (quoting Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State 
Constitutions:  The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1131, 1137 (1999)). 
 Plaintiffs mischaracterize this Court’s orders and the actions of the 
2014 Legislature, and, because they have failed to acknowledge the 
distinction between positive rights and negative restrictions on 
government action, they misunderstand the options available to the Court.
6
  
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Answer at 3 (characterizing the Court as having ordered 
the State to “cease its violation” of children’s positive right to an amply funded basic 
education by 2018 and exhorting the Court to “stop[ ] the State’s violation” of the right to 
an amply funded basic education); id. at 9-10 (arguing that the Court has power to “bring 
  8 
As a consequence, they disregard the Court’s careful recognition that this 
case involves a “delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation” that 
“test[s] the limits of judicial restraint and discretion.”  Id. at 519 (quoting 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 497, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)).  
There is no government action to “bring to a halt.”  The appropriate 
remedy is one that results in the enactment of legislation that “achieves or 
is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally prescribed end’ ” by 
2018.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 519. 
2. Sanctioning the State to Force Compliance With the 
January 2014 Order Would not Increase the Likelihood 
of Achieving Compliance With Article IX, Section 1 by 
2018 
 In its January 2012 decision, the Court stated that its purpose in 
retaining jurisdiction was to foster a dialogue with the Legislature that 
would further the shared goal of providing ample funding for educational 
reforms by 2018.  The January 2014 Order reiterated the Court’s desire to 
“foster dialogue and cooperation in reaching a goal shared by all 
Washingtonians.”  January 2014 Order at 8.  The State suggests that the 
order to submit a “complete plan” should be viewed as part of that 
dialogue, intended to further the ultimate goal of constitutional 
compliance. 
                                                                                                                         
a halt” to the constitutional violation at issue); id. at 13 (arguing that the Court has power 
to “stop” the State from violating the constitutional right of schoolchildren). 
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 Preferring confrontation to dialogue, Plaintiffs urge the Court to 
require a special legislative session to produce a plan by December 31, 
2014, under the threat of a strong coercive sanction to follow.
7
  Plaintiffs’ 
Answer at 24-28.  As explained in the State’s Opening Brief at 13, a plan 
adopted by the 63rd Legislature would not bind the 64th Legislature.
8
  
Compelling the 63rd Legislature to convene a special session to adopt a 
nonbinding plan would place form over substance, and impede, not 
facilitate, legislative progress toward the real goal:  legislative 
development and enactment of strategies that amply fund basic education 
by 2018.  Amicus brief of former Governors at 5, 10. 
 Plaintiffs dismiss the concern that a finding of contempt followed 
by sanctions runs the real risk of poisoning the Court’s dialogue with the 
Legislature, or at minimum distracting the focus of both the Legislature 
and the Court from the ultimate goal.  In part, this risk is present because 
the Legislature is the only entity with constitutional authority to take the 
actions required by the Court’s January 2014 Order to the State.  And the 
                                                 
7
 The Legislature may call itself into special session or may convene, if it 
chooses, in response to a proclamation by the Governor.  Const. art. II, § 12(2), art. III, 
§ 7.  But no provision of the Washington Constitution authorizes the Court to order a 
special session of the Legislature. 
8
 As explained both in the Leg. 2014 Report at 34-38, and in the amicus brief of 
the former Governors at 10-11, the Legislature operates on a biennial budget-writing 
cycle and is not institutionally equipped to make long-term revenue and funding plans 
during the non-budget-writing sessions.  Because of that institutional constraint, it may 
have been unrealistic to expect a complete plan by April 30. 
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Legislature is not a normal party in civil litigation, like a private 
corporation or partnership (Plaintiffs’ Answer at 19); it is a coequal branch 
in a government of constitutionally divided powers, and it possesses some 
powers that are beyond the Court’s authority to command, as summarized 
below.  A finding of contempt and the imposition of coercive sanctions 
may satisfy Plaintiffs, but it will not promote progress toward ample 
provision for basic education. 
3. The Court’s Power to Sanction for Contempt Is Subject 
to Constitutional Limits 
 Plaintiffs nevertheless take the position that if the Court finds the 
State in contempt, it is then free to take virtually any action that could 
coerce legislative compliance, including commandeering legislative power 
to force full constitutional compliance by the 2015 Legislature.  In doing 
so, they lose sight of two important limitations. 
a. A Sanction Must Address the Act Leading to a 
Finding of Contempt 
 The first limitation is the subject matter of this contempt 
proceeding.  It was a failure to produce a plan that led to the possibility of 
contempt, and thus the purpose of any remedial sanction should be to 
coerce submission of a plan.  See King v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 
110 Wn.2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988).  But Plaintiffs continue to 
advocate much broader sanctions, as if the State has failed to meet the 
  11 
2018 deadline this Court adopted.  In its original decision, however, the 
Court recognized the difficulty of the task ahead and gave the State six 
years to develop and implement a constitutional system of funding basic 
education.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545-47.  We are not yet halfway to 
that deadline, and Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions to compel compliance 
with that deadline is premature.  The appropriate focus for a sanction, if 
there were to be one, is the Court’s January 2014 Order to submit a plan. 
b. A Sanction Must Not Exceed Constitutional 
Limits of the Court’s Power 
 The second limitation is constitutional.  Plaintiffs appear to believe 
that the Court is not bound by any constitutional limitation in crafting a 
sanction if it first finds the State in contempt.  But the Court’s power to 
enforce its orders is not unbounded.  The Court’s exercise of its power still 
must be guided by separation of powers limitations and by other 
constitutional limitations and principles. 
 Separation of Powers.  As detailed in our prior briefing, the 
doctrine of separation of powers stands as a constitutional bar against one 
branch of government invading or undermining powers that are 
constitutionally delegated to another branch.  Brown v. Owen, 165 Wn.2d 
706, 718-19, 206 P.3d 310 (2009).  In the context of this case, the 
constitutional concern is that a sanction may invade or effectively assume 
  12 
control of the taxing and/or appropriation powers reserved by our 
constitution to the Legislature. 
 Article VIII, section 4 of the Washington Constitution places the 
authority for appropriation of funds exclusively in the Legislature.  “Long 
ago, we recognized the central object of section 4 was to secure to the 
legislative department of the government the exclusive power of deciding 
how, when, and for what purposes the public funds shall be applied in 
carrying on the government.”  Washington Ass’n of Neighborhood Stores 
v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 365, 70 P.3d 920 (2003) (quoting State v. 
Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1 (1917) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 The Court has recognized there may be “special situations” where 
it may have authority to order the expenditure of state funds.  See Hillis v. 
Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 390, 932 P.2d 139 (1997) (citing In re 
Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 242, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) (judiciary has 
the inherent power to compel funding of its own functions); see also City 
of Ellensburg v. State, 118 Wn.2d 709, 717-18, 826 P.2d 1081 (1992) 
(citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wn.2d 476, as an example of a “rare 
case” in which the judiciary may interfere with the Legislature’s 
constitutional power of appropriation.).  But separation of power concerns 
are implicated any time the judiciary seeks to exert control over 
  13 
appropriations, and this Court has never held that those concerns disappear 
in the “rare case” in which there is a competing constitutional mandate.9 
 In like manner, article VII, section 5 of the Washington 
Constitution vests the State’s authority to impose taxes solely in the 
Legislature.  See Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wn.2d 
752, 770, 131 P.3d 892 (2006) (“It is elementary that the power of 
taxation, subject to constitutional limitations, rests solely in the 
legislature.”) (quoting State ex rel. Tacoma Sch. Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 
689, 690, 30 P.2d 638 (1934)); Ban-Mac, Inc. v. King County, 69 Wn.2d 
49, 51, 416 P.2d 694 (1966) (“[Article VII] places revenue and taxation 
matters under legislative control.  We may construe but not legislate in tax 
matters.”); Gruen v. State Tax Comm’n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 64, 211 P.2d 651 
(1949) (“[T]he state’s fiscal policy has been by the constitution delegated 
to the legislature and not to this court.”).  While the Court may direct the 
Legislature to exercise its power of taxation to fund a program that is 
constitutionally mandated, Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wn.2d 591, 599, 589 
P.2d 1235 (1979), the Court may not itself assume that power.  See Ban-
Mac, Inc., 69 Wn.2d at 51 (“We may construe but not legislate in tax 
                                                 
9
 Ironically, in Juvenile Director, the Court relied on separation of powers—the 
need to protect the judicial branch from improper checks by the legislative branch—as 
the constitutional justification for judicial incursion into the legislative function.  87 
Wn.2d at 244-45. 
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matters.”); State ex rel. Hart v. Gleeson, 189 Wash. 292, 295-96, 64 P.2d 
1023 (1937) (Court cannot legislate to remedy the Legislature’s failure or 
refusal to delegate additional taxing power to counties).  If the Legislature 
falters, the constitutional remedy is to invalidate the effort and direct the 
Legislature to try again; it is not for the Court to step into the Legislature’s 
shoes. 
 Legislative Immunity.  Any sanction that would have the effect of 
imposing liability on legislators because they did or did not vote in a 
certain way would violate the state constitution’s speech and debate clause 
in article II, section 17.  See State of Washington’s Reply at 16 (May 29, 
2014).  Moreover, any such sanction would be inappropriate because 
Plaintiffs sued the State of Washington, not any individual legislator.  For 
the State to respond to the Court’s Order, it is the Legislature that must 
enact legislation, and it can do so only collectively.  Const. art. II, sec. 22. 
4. The Court’s Power to Sanction for Contempt Is Subject 
to Practical Limits 
 As explained above, the Court lacks constitutional power to 
assume the Legislature’s taxing and spending functions.  The Court’s 
constitutional role is to determine the constitutionality of legislation after 
  15 
it is enacted, not in anticipation of enactment.
10
  It is not the Court’s 
constitutional role to direct the content of legislation.
11
 
 Plaintiffs nevertheless have proposed various remedies in which 
the Court would order additional spending on K-12 education or prohibit 
expenditures for “non-paramount” purposes unless and until K-12 
education is fully funded.  Plaintiffs’ Answer at 31-38.  Amici have 
proposed additional remedies, in which the Court would compel tax 
increases
12
 or adopt a sort of judicial line-item veto.
13
 
 To the extent these remedies are framed as options for the 
Legislature to choose from in exercising its constitutional taxing and 
appropriations powers to achieve the constitutional compliance the Court 
ordered in its 2012 decision, the remedies may be constitutionally 
permissible.  But to the extent they contemplate the Court making the 
specific determinations regarding new taxes, spending cuts to other 
programs, or which “non-paramount” programs are essential or 
                                                 
10
 State ex rel. O’Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn.2d 85, 87, 436 P.2d 786 (1968) 
(“[W]e cannot pass on the constitutionality of proposed legislation . . . until the 
legislative process is complete and the bill or measure has been enacted into law.”). 
11
 Washington State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wn.2d 284, 307, 174 
P.3d 1142 (2007) (“It is neither the prerogative nor the function of this court to substitute 
our judgment for that of the legislature in enacting laws unless those laws clearly 
contravene state or federal constitutional provisions.”). 
12
 Amicus brief of Washington State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 16-19. 
13
 Amicus brief of Superintendent of Public Instruction at 5-12. 
  16 
expendable, they require the Court to assume a legislative function for 
which it is not equipped. 
 The Court should not use contempt as a vehicle for fashioning a 
remedy requiring reform of the existing state revenue system, as the 
Washington State Budget & Policy Center advocates,
14
 or undertaking to 
take control of legislative decisionmaking, as Plaintiffs advocate,
15
 or 
establishing a judicial process for vetoing spending decisions, as the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction advocates.
16
  There is no need to do 
so, because the Court’s traditional power to address unconstitutional 
legislative action is adequate and more appropriate.  The Court possesses 
unquestioned constitutional authority to invalidate challenged legislation 
that violates the Washington Constitution.  What it lacks is constitutional 
authority to legislate or to mandate the content of specific legislation. 
C. No Sanction Should Be Ordered, if at All, Until the 2015 
Legislature Is Given an Opportunity to Act 
 Plaintiffs ask for aggressive enforcement action now to force 
compliance with article IX, section 1.  Only such action, they argue, will 
demonstrate to schoolchildren that their rights under article IX, section 1 
matter.  Plaintiffs’ Answer at 52. 
                                                 
14
 Amicus brief of Washington State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 16-19. 
15
 Plaintiffs’ Answer at 31-41. 
16
 Amicus brief of Superintendent of Public Instruction at 5-12. 
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 The proper lesson for schoolchildren is that the entire constitution 
matters.  The distribution of government power among separate branches 
matters.  The integrity of the legislative process matters.  Their rights are 
protected not just by article IX, section 1, but by their government’s 
respect for and adherence to all provisions of the constitution. 
 The means of achieving compliance with article IX, section 1 
matter every bit as much as the compliance itself.  The constitutional 
mandate to amply fund basic education does not exist in a constitutional 
vacuum and provides no justification for disregarding any other provision 
of the constitution.  It provides no constitutional basis for the judiciary to 
invade or arrogate the legislative function constitutionally delegated 
exclusively to the legislative branch. 
 We previously explained why no sanction should be imposed 
before the 2015 legislative session.  State’s Opening Brief at 30; see also 
amicus brief of former Governors at 1-2.  The Court adopted a 2018 
deadline for full compliance with article IX, section 1, and it will have a 
full opportunity to enforce that deadline at that time, through the use of 
traditional remedies for responding to unconstitutional legislation.  It 
should continue to give the Legislature the opportunity to meet that 
deadline. 
  18 
 There is an additional reason the Court should allow the 2015 
Legislature to act, rather than dictating specific solutions now.  Although 
this case involves retained jurisdiction, at its core it is an adversary 
proceeding, which is not an appropriate forum to decide overarching 
questions of state policy.  The information a court receives in an adversary 
proceeding is dominated by the parties, often to the exclusion of the wider 
universe of information possessed by the public. 
 When deciding a dispute between adversaries, those evidentiary 
limitations are efficient and effective, but not when deciding public policy, 
as this case illustrates.  The State’s paramount duty is not its sole duty.  
Plaintiffs focus solely on obtaining more money for education.  Their 
single-minded focus suggests a willingness to risk real harm to 
Washington residents to achieve that goal.  There is no doubt that ample 
provision for basic education is the State’s paramount duty under the 
constitution.  But the health, safety, and welfare of residents also are 
vitally important, yet Plaintiffs dismiss them as “constitutionally 
irrelevant.”  Plaintiffs’ Answer at 30. 
 Amici address some of the harms at issue if the Court were to 
mandate increased education spending without consideration of other 
public interests.  See Amicus brief of former Governors at 15-18; Amicus 
brief of Columbia Legal Services et al. at 4-17; Amicus of Washington 
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State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 11-12.  Plaintiffs would sacrifice 
these interests, many of which provide critical support for children.
17
  
Balancing these interests for the residents of Washington is the 
Legislature’s responsibility, not Plaintiffs—and not the Court’s, in the 
context of one lawsuit. 
 The Court should not get distracted by “the procedural trees rather 
than the constitutional forest.”  Amicus brief of former Governors at 6.  
Rather than dwell on the Legislature’s failure to submit a plan, the Court 
should restore the focus of this case to the shared goal of determining how 
to provide the best educational opportunities to all of Washington’s 
children.  Id. at 1.  Plaintiffs’ proposed remedies will not further that goal. 
D. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Three-Part Remedy Will Not Promote 
Progress Toward Constitutional Compliance 
 The Plaintiffs propose a three-part enforcement order that makes 
little sense.  First, they ask the Court to hold the State in contempt until it 
complies with the Court’s various orders.  Plaintiffs’ Answer at 6, 25, 53.  
The request rests on a faulty foundation.  On its face, the request is 
                                                 
17
 See Plaintiffs’ Answer at 29-30 (characterizing all other spending as merely 
“non-paramount things State officials want to fund”) (Plaintiffs’ emphasis omitted); id. at 
33 (“[T]he merit of any particular non-education program is not the question here.  The 
question is whether prohibiting (or limiting) State expenditures on any particular non-
education program until the legislature complies with this Court’s Order can coerce 
compliance with that Order.”) (Plaintiffs’ emphasis omitted); id. at 38 (“[T]he State’s 
invocation of possible funding impacts on other State programs is constitutionally 
irrelevant in this case.”). 
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overbroad insofar as it links compliance to anything other than submission 
of a plan to the Court, because Plaintiffs candidly admit they view 
contempt as a means to coerce the compliance due in 2018.  Plaintiffs’ 
Answer at 36.  Plaintiffs in essence ask the Court to hold the State in 
contempt until full compliance is achieved.  But, as the State has 
repeatedly pointed out in this brief and in its opening brief, the Court’s 
Order to Show Cause is based solely on the failure to submit a “complete 
plan”—not a failure to fully achieve the 2018 implementation goal.  The 
Court should not hold the State in contempt for failing to achieve full 
compliance before 2018. 
 Second, Plaintiffs propose enjoining the imposition of “any more” 
unfunded or underfunded mandates on schools.  Plaintiffs’ Answer at 7, 
25-27, 53.  They supply no nexus between an “unfunded/underfunded 
mandates” injunction and the issue giving rise to the show cause order, 
i.e., the failure to submit a plan.  Rather, this part of their three-part 
proposal is premature.  It is an alternative remedy for an ultimate failure to 
implement finance reforms necessary to cure the constitutional violation. 
 An injunction “must be tailored to remedy the specific harms 
shown rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law.”  Kitsap 
County v. Kev, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 135, 143, 720 P.2d 818 (1986).  Plaintiffs 
do not dispute the legal standard.  They argue that the specific harm is 
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“further digging the unconstitutional funding hole.”  Plaintiffs’ Answer at 
27.  Their argument incorrectly presupposes that facts have been 
established regarding specific unfunded or underfunded mandates and that 
specific mandates have been identified by the Court, when in fact the 
Plaintiffs can cite only to their own assertions.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 
Answer at 25 (citing their own prior briefing). 
 Plaintiffs also simplistically argue that everyone knows an 
unfunded (and presumably, underfunded) mandate when they see it.  
Plaintiffs’ Answer at 26-27.  But Plaintiffs surely understand that such a 
broad injunction would be an invitation for additional litigation over 
whether any particular piece of education policy legislation implicates a 
state funding obligation and, if so, what the funding level should be.  
Additional sub-litigation during the period that the State is phasing in its 
finance remedies is unlikely to be helpful in achieving constitutional 
compliance.  This Court recognized as much in setting the stage for 
retaining jurisdiction in this case.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 544 (“Too 
much deference may set the stage for another major lawsuit challenging 
the legislature’s failure to adhere to its own implementation schedule.”). 
 The final part of Plaintiffs’ proposed three-part remedy asks for 
“strong judicial enforcement orders” in January 2015 if the 63rd 
Legislature does not submit a plan by December 2014.  Plaintiffs’ Answer 
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at 7, 27-28, 53.  Presumably the “strong judicial enforcement orders” 
refers to the sanctions they previously proposed.  They don’t say. 
 The Court should reject Plaintiffs’ desire to squeeze more out of 
the 63rd Legislature.  They have failed to make any credible case for why 
the 63rd Legislature should be forced to act to prepare a plan that cannot 
bind the 64th Legislature mere weeks before the new Legislature convenes 
with newly-elected members.  It smacks of punishment.  Instead, there are 
sound prudential reasons for the Court not to consider such an order.
18
  
Just as judicial preparation may take place outside of the courtroom or 
even outside of chambers, legislative preparation may occur outside of the 
Legislative Building.
19
  All branches of the State should be focused on 
facilitating an environment most calculated to yield progress in 2015.  
That includes sustained judicial vigilance.  But the incoming Legislature 
                                                 
18
 For example, the voters will be considering a new set of education funding 
requirements in Initiative 1351 in November.  According to the Fiscal Impact Statement 
(https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2014/Gene
ral-Election/Pages/Online-Voters-Guide.aspx), that initiative could impose a new 
statutory funding requirement of $4.7 billion through 2019 without any provision for 
increasing state revenues.  Should I-1351 be adopted, any plan adopted by the 2014 
Legislature would be incomplete or worthless for use by the 2015 Legislature.  If it fails 
at the polls, legislators and pundits will mine its failure for its political significance.  This 
example illustrates the uncertain political landscape continuing to year’s end and the folly 
of Plaintiffs’ demand for a plan of the eve of the new Legislature taking office. 
19
 See Amicus brief of former Governors at 12-13 (discussing their experience 
with the deliberative legislative process); Amicus brief of Washington State Budget & 
Policy Center et al. at 11-12 (discussing preparations by the Governor’s Office). 
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also must have time between the fall elections and the start of the 2015 
session to prepare for progress. 
 We have argued that no sanctions should be considered before the 
end of the 2015 session, if at all.  Nonetheless, if the Court is inclined to 
issue some type of “strong judicial enforcement order” between now and 
the end of the 2015 legislative session, the Court should not wait until 
January 2015.  An order on the eve of the legislative session will not 
promote progress toward constitutional compliance.  We have argued that 
the Court can craft a more effective and appropriate remedy, if one is 
necessary, at the conclusion of the 2015 legislative session once its 
success or shortcoming can be assessed.  But if the Court determines after 
this show cause proceeding that it should identify a particular remedy if 
the 2015 Legislature fall short of expectations, the State should be 
informed now of that remedy, so it can be taken into consideration in 
planning for the 2015 legislative session. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 The Court should not find the State in contempt and should impose 
no sanction on the State for its failure to submit the plan specified in the 
Court’s January 2014 Order.  If the Court determines a sanction should be  
  


